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ABstrACt
Thomas Christiano’s vision of international migration asserts that 
democratic states are morally required to work together with other 
democratic states to create transnational institutions that can develop 
appropriate principles to govern such migration. I argue that Christiano’s 
analysis faces two key difficulties: first, it ascribes legitimate content-
independent authority to transnational bodies, and we have no reason to 
think that such bodies actually possess such authority; and, second, it 
asserts that such bodies would be likely to arrive at justifiable principles to 
govern migration, and we have no reason to think that these bodies will 
actually do so.  
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INTRODUCTION
I sometimes think that philosophy, not nationalism, is the real home of the 
narcissism of small differences. Thomas Christiano’s analysis of migration 
has all the virtues I most prize: it is philosophically rigorous, informed by 
empirical reality without being unduly deferential to current circumstance, 
and most of all it seems largely right. It starts from where we are – in a world 
carved up into separate states – and asks where we ought to go from here; 
the answers it gives us seem, to me, almost perfect. So, naturally, I am going 
to spend my time discussing that almost. I want, in this commentary, to 
make it clear why someone who accepts so much of Christiano’s view can 
disagree with one central bit of that view. Christiano’s analysis places the 
authority for migration decision-making in the collective institutional 
1  This is a commentary on Thomas Christiano’s “Democracy, Migration and 
International Institutions” (Christiano 2017). I am grateful to José Martí, as well as two 
anonymous reviewers for this journal, for helpful suggestions and criticisms.  
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dialogue of democratic states speaking with (and building treaties with) 
one another, rather than within the individual decision-making of a single 
state. On his view, a state is not morally permitted to go it alone, working out 
the migration policy it thinks best reflects justice. The legitimate agent to be 
charged with migration policy is collective, not individual, and a state does 
wrong when it fails to recognize the content-independent authority of a 
transnational community of like-minded states to work out together those 
specific treaties that might fulfill the cosmopolitan duties of each individual 
state. I think this isn’t right – or, rather, that it isn’t quite right; treaties and 
collective decision-making can be useful tools, and perhaps correctives to 
the blindness of individual states, but they are no more than that.
Why, though, does Christiano think that this international society has 
legitimate authority to determine the contours of a global migration 
regime? The argument begins with the simple thought that there are some 
global goals that any individual state is morally bound to promote. 
Christiano’s example is migration – he imagines a situation in which one 
state has great labor-force needs, while another has an ample supply of 
laborers who suffer from relatively impoverished economic circumstances. 
These circumstances, he argues, do not look like an opportunity for 
beneficence or charity; they look like a global problem, one whose solution 
places moral demands on both state parties. These state parties are, in 
other words, morally required to work together to solve this global problem 
– a fact that is not limited to this particular sort of one-off problem. Instead, 
there are a great many moral obligations whose best solution involves 
some form of collective reasoning about how to work together at the global 
level. This fact, for Christiano, demands that states regard the process of 
working together as a moral imperative. This means, though, that the 
proper agent setting the terms of cooperation cannot be an individual 
state; it must, instead, be the global community itself. There is, then, no 
right for an individual state to break away, and rely upon its own sense of 
how to respond to the challenge of global justice; the right to determine 
final responses to global problems is held by the collective of like-minded 
states, rather than by any individual global agent.
This description, of course, flattens a great deal in Christiano’s complex 
and subtle reasoning, but I do not think it is a wholly unjust description. 
Christiano is, in particular, emphatic that states do not have the right to 
“go it alone” in international politics; they are obliged to enter into 
agreements with other states, and to live up to the demands placed on 
them by the bodies created by those treaties – even when they think those 
demands are wrong-headed or inefficient. It is with this last part, though, 
that I want to begin my disagreement. I want to make two particular claims 
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against Christiano’s view: the first is that we have comparatively less 
reason than he thinks to ascribe content-independent authority to 
international bodies. The second is that we have less reason than he 
believes to think that the decision-making of such bodies is likely to lead to 
good results. I will discuss these claims in order.
We can start with this central question, then: why should we regard 
some other agent than ourselves as having the right to determine our moral 
duties? What makes some other agent, in other words, rightly understood 
to legitimate authority over us? I can think of three possibilities:
(1)  Elucidation.  The dialogue produced by some discursive body 
might enable us to better understand our own pre-existing moral 
obligations.
(2)  Efficiency.  The dialogue produced by some discursive body 
might enable us to more effectively pursue our own pre-existing 
moral obligations.
(3)  Establishment.  The dialogue produced by some discursive body 
might, in itself, produce novel moral obligations (whose norma-
tive force may, of course, be dependent upon some pre-existing 
form of moral obligation).
I think that elucidation and efficiency should strike us as radically 
different sorts of things than establishment. For an example of elucidation 
and efficiency, we might look to the Sierra Club. I accept that we have some 
moral duty to protect the natural spaces of the planet, although I have 
some difficulty in explaining how that duty is to be defended. That duty, 
though, is best pursued with other agents; it’s comparatively difficult to 
preserve wetlands as a single agent, after all, and the Sierra Club acts as a 
sort of force multiplier to my own meager efforts. That seems, to me, to say 
that there is some moral force in the efficiency of pursuing my pre-existing 
obligation to preserve wetlands by means of a membership in the Sierra 
Club. The Sierra Club, too, has people who have thought more about 
wetlands than I have, and they focus the attention of the Sierra Club on 
those places and policies where it would do the most good. That, of course, 
is elucidation. I don’t know much about wetlands, apart from the fact that 
they should be wet and that there should be more of them. The Sierra Club 
allows me to fulfill my pre-existing duty in an efficient, informed way.
My duty to pay taxes, in contrast, seems somewhat different. I think the 
creation of the political society of the United States gave rise to novel 
obligations – including, notably, the obligation to pay my taxes to the 
federal government of the United States. It is not as if I had a pre-existing 
duty to pay taxes, and the good people of the Internal Revenue Service 
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sprang up to help me live a more dutiful life. They are, instead, insisting 
upon their authority to determine the appropriate level of taxation – a duty 
that would not exist, but for the creation of the institutions of government 
that demand resources. If we want to translate this into discursive terms, I 
think the dialogue of the United States Congress when it determines the 
marginal tax rate is simply a different animal than the dialogue between 
the Sierra Club and the various stakeholders working together to preserve 
wetlands. I am obligated, I think, to regard the dialogue of the United 
States Congress as imposing moral duties on me. (If I insist upon the moral 
right to determine the proper level of income tax, I am wrong at both the 
moral and legal levels.) These duties might have, lurking in the background, 
something like the Kantian duty to leave the state of nature and join 
political society; nevertheless, they are genuinely novel duties, established 
simply because the United States Congress has created (and the President 
signed) a Constitutionally-valid law. The Sierra Club, in contrast, simply 
offers me a home within which I can best pursue duties that were not 
created by the Sierra Club. It offers efficiency and elucidation; it does not, 
in itself establish any particular duty.
This is important, I think, because it shows that the “legitimacy” of the 
Sierra Club is rather unlike the legitimacy of the United States. The Sierra 
Club might be a good thing to belong to – but I do not think I do anything 
particularly wrong if I cease to become a member of that society, and focus 
my attention on the plight of the homeless, or nuclear disarmament, or 
some other worthy cause. I might, indeed, decide that the Sierra Club has 
lost its way, and withdraw for reasons of policy. I have, in short, no content-
independent reasons to think that I have to listen to the Sierra Club, even if 
it does help me do the things I believe are morally valuable for me to do. It 
is useful; it is not legitimate, in the manner of a legitimate government.
Which of these, though, should we take as the best analogue to 
international society? Christiano wants international society to have 
content-independent authority; states have some limited freedom to 
withdraw, but in most cases states are bound to listen to the determinations 
and conclusions of multilateral decision-making, even when they think 
those bodies have made moral mistakes. International society, on this 
analysis, should be able to create new duties for us, simply because 
international society decides that we ought to do (or refrain from doing) a 
particular thing. I do not think, though, that we have any reason to think 
that international society does anything like that at all. At most, 
international society as a discursive site provides a given state with the 
ability to elucidate its pre-existing moral duties, and an efficient means of 
pursuing these duties. It does not, however, create new duties itself.  
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One way of seeing this is to imagine what would happen were the 
institutions in question to disappear. If the Sierra Club were to go out of 
business, I take it my moral duties would be unchanged; I would have the 
same reason to value wetlands I always did.  If the United States Government 
were to go out of business, though, I do not think I would have any reason 
to pay my taxes. The United States Government does not simply offer us a 
means through which pre-existing duties might be fulfilled; it generates 
new duties, and the Government has legitimate authority to insist that 
those duties ought to be fulfilled. International society, to my eyes, looks 
more like the Sierra Club than anything state-like. If the rest of the world, 
except for one lonely democracy, were to tip over into fascism or terror, the 
duty of that democracy to promote a just world through its migration policy 
would not disappear.2 It did not begin with the world’s institutions, and the 
end of those institutions would not be the end of the duty. If anything, the 
duty would be felt more keenly in that benighted world.
There is, of course, a good response to this, which I think Christiano 
finds plausible: we might simply say that there is a duty to pursue one’s 
mandatory aims in the best way possible. Where something offers an ef-
fective and intelligible means to a mandatory end, perhaps that means is 
itself mandatory. This idea, though, should be resisted.  In the first place, it 
is not clear that we are required – as people or as polities – to maximize 
efficiency in our pursuit of mandatory goals. I take it as being true, for in-
stance, that we are obligated to give up some of our treasure and some of 
our time to ensure the survival of needy people living abroad. I do not 
believe, though, that this goal demands that we choose that form of life 
most effective at the maximal pursuit of this goal. Some do, of course; Peter 
Singer’s “effective altruism” begins precisely with the thought that one 
ought to develop that course of life that is best positioned to save as many 
human lives as possible. Most of us, though, recoil from this conclusion; 
those of us with a Kantian disposition might argue that we are entitled to 
build lives for ourselves that we find meaningful, even if the lives of others 
might be made vastly less horrifying were we to become 
2  An anonymous referee for this journal has suggested to me that, if we interpret the 
United States as simply interpreting pre-existing moral duties, then the distinction between 
global and domestic political institutions is exaggerated. I agree with this; I do not, though, 
think that any domestic political agency is best understood only as offering interpretations 
of pre-existing moral duties. To take one simple example: the United States has rules, as does 
every society, about how to run a fair election – how, for instance, to balance fairness and 
formal freedom in the rules of electoral communication. It is perhaps possible to interpret 
these rules as specifying pre-existing moral duties, but I think it is best to understand the 
authority of these rules as emerging from the content-independent authority of the political 
community itself.
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altruistically-minded financiers.  The duty of beneficence, we might say, 
does not demand that we live on the Pareto frontier.  If this is true for indi-
viduals, though, then why should it not be similarly true for societies? 
Christiano presents a series of considerations, in which the ability of a state 
to promote the interests of its members is weighed against the needs of 
prospective migrants. Many of us, though, think that this is a bit prema-
ture; why, exactly, must a state regard itself as obligated to take only that 
pathway which would be most justifiable at the global level?  Is there no 
national equivalent to the agent-centered prerogative? 
This is made more complex, I think, from the fact that the world has no 
shortage of morally obligatory goals – many of which, it seems, live in 
tension with the others. Take, for example, the goals of economic 
development, the preservation of cultural heritage, and global 
environmental protection. That these do not all point in the same direction 
should be obvious; a society that focuses on economic development will 
likely cause some damage to the environment along the way, and will likely 
undermine some parts of its cultural heritage; we can see both of these, for 
instance, in the process of South Korea’s industrialization in the 1980s. A 
society that focuses on cultural heritage, though, will have to forego some 
forms of economic development, and might find itself unable to accept 
some innovations that might reduce the overall environmental footprint 
of its form of life. (A traditionalist society that bans wind energy and solar 
farms is likely going to end up stuck with some carbon-intensive forms of 
transportation infrastructure.) I raise these points not just to be depressing, 
but because I think we might accept that there is something like value 
pluralism at the collective level as well as the individual one. There are 
some things, Christiano and I agree, that a society cannot do. Within these 
bounds, though, I think I am more worried than he is that there is a plurality 
of valuable goals, each of which might justify some forms of state action – 
and which cannot be pursued simultaneously. This means, though, that 
there is something lost in the sacrifice of national sovereignty to a 
transnational body. A state that wants to do something “idiosyncratic”, I 
think, might not always be simply selfish; it might simply disagree with its 
fellow members of international society about which good ought to be 
foremost, here and now, for it.3  
3  An anonymous reviewer for this journal has suggested that there is no space for 
states to be “idiosyncratic” in this way, since agent-centered prerogatives apply (if at all) to 
individuals, not to states. For my part, I am not sure that something like such prerogatives 
could not apply to collections of persons, as much as to individual persons; there is nothing 
in liberalism, I believe, that prevents a state from identifying some particular good as having 
particular importance in the history and self-understanding of a particular society.  
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Of course, sometimes the state might not be doing anything so noble; it 
might just be selfish. Christiano suggests that the need to justify state 
action to international society might undermine this sort of selfishness, as 
democratic societies get in the practice of justifying themselves to fellow 
democracies. I think, though, that even the best transnational body will 
probably not do anything this beneficial; instead, for structural reasons, I 
think Christiano’s international society will probably be considerably less 
benevolent than he imagines. The problem, in brief, is that the elites of 
each society gain their power by appealing to the citizens of their own 
societies, who – we can imagine – are ordinary humans of limited 
benevolence and compassion. This means, though, that the success of 
democratic peace offers us no reason to think that the collective decision-
making of international society will be anything other than selfish and 
xenophobic. Democratic peace is comprehensible; states in which the 
elites gain power from the consent of (some of) the voters are less able to 
throw those voters into an unwanted war. Why, though, should we think 
that the discussions of democratic states will tend towards benevolence 
towards non-citizens? This is one of the striking facts about democracy as 
a procedure: it offers no voice at all to those outside the ambit of the 
domestic law. It offers the alien, at best, some procedural safeguards in the 
application of law against his person; it offers him, though, no voice in the 
creation of that law. That means, in other words, that the elites of any given 
society have no reason at all, apart from virtue, to care about the interests 
of the destitute who are non-members; these impoverished people are not 
voters, and existing voters can be counted on to be frequently hostile to the 
interests of these impoverished newcomers. The result, though, is that a 
dialogue between the elites of a set of democratic states will often end up 
defending justice for current citizens, whose voting power gives them 
enough power to make things awkward for elites – and an iron bar placed 
against the outsider, who has no voice or power with which to contest. 
Having a group of democratic states in negotiation with one another, in 
short, is likely to produce some morally defensible treaties between these 
democracies, but it is also likely to be vicious and cruel towards out-group 
members. The Schengen accords, for instance, made travel within the 
Schengen Area easier – but also mandated crackdowns on asylum and 
refugee law for those coming from outside that Area. Democracies, in 
short, are not necessarily inclined to be friendly towards those who cannot 
already vote, and having those democracies in conversation with one 
another may not produce any more defensible results than those that 
would have emerged from individual state agency. The recent history of 
the European Union in face of African migration, finally, offers us a 
sobering reminder that even the most internally just democracies are not 
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inclined to be gentle to outsiders; as I write this, over three thousand 
would-be migrants to the European Union have perished in the 
Mediterranean. These deaths are not a result of natural facts; they result 
from the choices of the European Union, in the 2000s, to institute carrier 
sanctions on air carriers, which pushed undocumented migrants towards 
boats, rather than aircraft. When democracies come together to build 
treaties, they are as likely to reinforce vice as virtue.  
It is, of course, also true that Christiano intends his argument as an 
ideal theory, building on but not reducible to current global reality. This 
makes it difficult for us to conclude that any of what I have just said would 
necessarily be true of a world run on Christiano’s principles. Nevertheless, 
I am skeptical. Virtue, as Kant said very long ago, is an unstable basis for 
political right. To the extent that Christiano’s view demands that 
democracies spontaneously exhibit virtue, it might be true that the view is 
unstable in the long run. If what I have said is true, then, we might have 
occasion to rethink how we ought to evaluate the legitimacy of migration 
policy. On my view, we need not think that multilateral institutions are the 
rightful home for legitimate policy; individual states have more freedom, 
to define and pursue their goals, than that. The world, I think, is messier 
than Christiano would allow. I have argued that Christiano’s multilateralism 
might not give us the results we desire; I have not, of course, said anything 
at all about what sort of institutions could do the job. I cannot, of course, 
hope to remedy this lack here. I would end, instead, by reiterating that all 
this disagreement must be placed against a backdrop of deep admiration 
and agreement; if I depart from Christiano, it is only with a due recognition 
that these few small differences pale before the wider spaces within which 
I believe his view to be elegant, defensible, and right.  
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